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Abstract 
 Luhmann (1984) defined society as a communication system which is 
structurally coupled to, but not an aggregate of, human action systems. The 
communication system is then considered as self-organizing ("autopoietic"), 
as are human actors. Communication systems can be studied by using 
Shannon's (1948) mathematical theory of communication. The update of a 
network by action at one of the local nodes is then a well-known problem in 
artificial intelligence (Pearl 1988). By combining these various theories, 
a general algorithm for probabilistic structure/action contingency can be 
derived. The consequences of this contingency for each system, its 
consequences for their further histories, and the stabilization on each 
side by counterbalancing mechanisms are discussed, in both mathematical and 
theoretical terms. An empirical example is elaborated. 
 
Keywords: social structure, communication, update, entropy, social action, 
conditionalization 
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THE PRODUCTION OF PROBABILISTIC ENTROPY  
IN STRUCTURE/ACTION CONTINGENCY RELATIONS 
 
 
 The emphasis on "self-referentiality" and "autopoiesis" in 
sociological theory enables us to use models from evolutionary biology for 
the analysis of social systems and their developments. Additionally, 
Luhmann (1984) proposed that society can be considered as constituted not 
of human beings, but of communications. This makes the study of social 
phenomena accessible for the mathematical modelling of communication 
patterns by means of Shannon's mathematical theory of communication 
(Shannon 1948). Luhmann (1984; 1990), however, elaborated this empirical 
perspective only with qualitative reference to evolution theory.  
 
 
Society as a system of communications 
 
 Of course, communications are generated by human beings and have to 
be understood by human beings, but Luhmann's sociology defines society as 
the network which is added to the actors as the nodes. The network differs 
in nature and in operation from the individual systems: individual 
"consciousness systems" process thoughts on the basis of perceptions; while 
society processes communications. The two systems are coupled structurally, 
i.e., they presuppose each other in the operation, but the one is not an 
aggregate of the other. In addition to the four billion or so people who 
perform their own self-referential loops (e.g., "thinking"), society is 
also a system. This system communicates with the actors at the nodes in 
terms of co-variances, while it exhibits auto-covariance in the remaining 
variance during any discrete time period. The social system is therefore 
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self-referential. (Whether self-referential social systems are also self-
reproducing and reflexive, and therefore "autopoietic," remains another 
empirical question (cf. Teubner 1988; Leydesdorff 1993b).) 
 In modern societies, communications are functionally differentiated. 
For example, one can communicate through market-transactions in the 
economy, or through love in personal relations. On the one hand, the focus 
on communications makes the theory of symbolic generalized communication 
media (cf. Parsons) the starting point for the development of the special 
sociologies (Luhmann 1982, 1988, and 1990). On the other hand, the 
reformulation of the unit of operation with reference to the communication 
system--instead of exclusive reference to the discrete actors--bridges the 
gap with symbolic interactionism as the other great tradition in American 
sociology (Luhmann 1975; Leydesdorff 1993c). 
 When the system is functionally differentiated, the structural 
coupling between actors and the social communication system may take 
different forms in the various subsystems. However, these forms are 
functionally equivalent, and thus we may expect that the structure/action 
contingency relation can be studied in terms of one underlying general 
algorithm (cf. Giddens 1979; Burt 1982). 
 
The mathematical theory of communication 
 Shannon (1948) deliberately chose to define information so that it 
would correspond with Boltzmann's (1877) definition of entropy in 
thermodynamics. In theoretical biology, evolutionary processes are 
increasingly studied in terms of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, i.e., as 
entropy generating processes (e.g., Brooks and Wiley 1986). Although 
Shannon's definitions have been controversial in the context of 
thermodynamics (e.g., Brillouin 1962; Wicken 1987), they have been less so 
when applied to social phenomena (e.g., Georgescu-Roegen 1971; Theil 1972; 
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Krippendorf 1986). The social sciences analyze variances: the variance of a 
distribution is expected to contain information which is part of the 
uncertainty in the system which exhibits the variation. This uncertainty 
can be considered as probabilistic entropy (cf. Bailey 1990). 
 At the technical level, it is possible to develop a continuous 
version of information theory using integral calculus (e.g., Shannon 1948; 
Theil 1978). However, for social phenomena the original, discrete version 
(which is also mathematically simpler) is more adequate, since actions are 
discrete instances. Measures of information theory in this discrete form 
are composed of sigmas, which allow for the systematic study of the 
processes of aggregation and disaggregation, and for the effects of 
groupings. Additionally, since the measures are non-parametrical and based 
only on probabilities (i.e., relative frequencies), neither the 
dimensionality of the problem nor the measurement scale is inhibitive (see 
also: Krippendorff 1986). Information theory can be developed in order to 
integrate static and dynamic forms of analysis (Theil 1972; Leydesdorff 
1991). 
 Let me now introduce the most important formulas. 
If we define h as the information content of the message that an event has 
occurred, then the expected information content of the distribution of a 
variable with relative frequency pi can be written as:  
 
 H =  Σi pi * hi       (1) 
 
By using Shannon's (1948) classical function for information  
(hi = 2log(1/pi)),i we may write: 
 
 H =  - Σi pi log pi      (2) 
 
and for the multi-variate case:  
 
 H = - Σi Σj Σk  pijk log pijk     (3) 
 
 As with chi-square, H can be used as a measure of the association 
among variables. The overall uncertainty for two variables x and y, H(x,y), 
is equal to H(y) plus the amount of uncertainty which x adds to it, given 
the uncertainty in y, i.e., H(x|y). (See Figure 1 from (Attnaeve 1959) for 
a visual representation.)  
 
 
Therefore:  
 
 H(x,y) =  H(y) + H(x|y)      (4) 
 
The mutual information or transmission between x and y is consequently 
defined as:  
 
 T(x,y) = H(x) - H(x|y) = H(y) - H(y|x)   (5) 
 
This is the reduction in the uncertainty of the prediction of x, given 
knowledge about the distribution of y. 
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 While "delta chi-square" does not have a clear interpretation,ii the 
decomposition of H (and I, below) in terms of the contribution to the 
uncertainty of each of the component cells (or subsets) is 
straightforward.iii Additionally the following formula can be derived for 
the disaggregation of H into g groups (Theil, 1972): 
 
 H = H0 +  Σg Pg * Hg      (6) 
 
 H0 is a measure of the uncertainty among the groups g, or in other 
words, a measure of the specificity of the distribution of the relevant 
variables within the groups.  
 On the basis of the above definition of information, it can be shown 
(see, e.g., Theil 1972) that if we have a system of mutually exclusive 
events, Ei, with prior probabilities pi, then the expected information 
content I of the message which transforms the prior probabilities pi into 
the posterior probabilities qi is given by the following expression: 
 
 I = Σi  qi  * log (qi / pi)     (7) 
 
Correspondingly, for the multi-variate case, the expected information 
content of the message transforming the prior probability distribution pijk 
of events into the posterior probability distribution qijk, is equal to: 
 
 I = Σi Σj Σk  qijk  * log (qijk / pijk)    (8) 
 
Although overall I >= 0,iv /\  I can become negative for a term if q < p.v 
(Of course, /\  H in formula (2) is always >= 0.) Furthermore, in the 
dynamic case the grouping rules among levels of aggregation are somewhat 
more complex than in the static case (cf. Theil 1972). 
 However, in principle, the two formulas, i.e., for H and I, provide 
us with a complete framework for the development of a set of methodologies 
equivalent to multi-variate analysis and to time series analysis, 
respectively (Leydesdorff 1991).vi 
 
The structure/action contingency relation 
 Let A be a structure and B a distribution of actors such that at each 
moment in time the actors will take action given this structure; thus, B is 
conditioned by A when it operates. Action which can thus be defined as B|A, 
has an impact on structure A only in instances thereafter. (See Figure 2 
for a visual representation.) 
 
 
  
 Structure (A) can also be considered as a network of which these 
actors (B) are the nodes (cf. Burt 1982). At each moment in time, the 
network conditions all the actors; if action takes place at any node(s), 
this conditions the network at the next moment.vii This model can be easily 
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generalized to the model of parallel distributed computers (see also: Pearl 
1988; Leydesdorff 1993c): each actor is comparable to a local processor 
which acts on the basis of its own programme given the conditions set by 
the network; while the operation of the network, which operates according 
to its own programme, is conditioned by the sum total of the previous 
actions. 
 Let us now describe these systems in information-theoretical terms. 
Structure A, which is expected to contain H(A) at time t conditions at that 
moment action(s) at B. Action can therefore be expected to contain only 
H(B|A)t information. At the next moment (t + 1), structure A is informed by 
the message that action(s) at B has/have taken place, and therefore the 
system thereafter contains an uncertainty H(A|B)t+1. In a later section I 
decompose this a posteriori information content in the information contents 
of the a priori systems (A and B|A, respectively), but let me here first 
focus on the dynamics of the message that action has occurred. 
 By using equation (7), we may write the information content of this 
message as follows:  
 
 I(A|B : A)  = Σ q(A|B) * log{ q(A|B) / p(A)}  (9) 
 
in which Σ q(A|B) represents the a posteriori state of the structure (A), 
i.e., after action (B) has occurred, while p(A) describes the a priori 
probability distribution. In other words: this formula expresses the 
information content of the message that the structure has self-
referentially to update its information content since actions at the 
network nodes B have occurred. 
 Since, according to the third law of the probability calculus: 
 
 p(A and B)  = p(A) * p(B|A)     (10) 
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   = p(B) * p(A|B)     (10') 
 
we may also write:  
 
      p(A) * p(B|A) 
 p(A|B)  =  ─────────────     (11) 
          p(B) 
 
 
This is known as Bayes' Formula, and expresses the a posteriori probability 
as a function of the a priori ones. Indices for a priori (t) and a 
posteriori (t + 1) probabilities can be written as follows:  
 
      p(A)t * p(B|A)t 
 p(A|B)t+1  =  ─────────────────    (11') 
          p(B)t 
 
 
or equivalently, and using q as indicator of the a posteriori probability: 
 
      q(A|B) * p(B) 
 p(A)  =   ───────────────────    (12) 
          p(B|A) 
 
 
Substituting (12) into (9) one obtains: 
 
 I(A|Bt+1 : At)  = Σ q(A|B) * log{ p(B|A) / p(B)} (13) 
 
This formula can also be written as the difference between two logarithms:  
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 I(A|B : A) = Σ q(A|B) * log{ q(A|B) / p(B)} + 
    - Σ q(A|B) * log{ q(A|B) / p(B|A)  
   = I(A|B : B) - I(A|B : B|A)    (14) 
 
 This difference is equal to an improvement of the prediction of the a 
posteriori structure: the expected information content of the message that 
A is conditioned by B (left-hand side of the equation) is equal to an 
improvement of the prediction of the a posteriori distribution (Σ q(A|B)) 
if one add to one's knowledge of the a priori distribution (Σ p(B)) the 
information about how the latter distribution was conditioned by the 
network distribution (Σ p(B|A)). 
 The crucial point is the implied shift in the systems of reference in 
formula (13). (This possibility is an analytical consequence of the 
dynamic, and therefore non-trivial interpretation of Bayes' Formula above.) 
 The right-hand factor of the right-hand term, i.e., (Σ p(B|A) / p(B)) in 
formula (13), describes the instantaneous conditioning of action by 
structure at time t, while the left-hand factor refers to the description 
of the network after action, i.e., Σ q(A|B) at the next moment. Therefore, 
the formula explicates how action at the nodes and the network are 
conditioned mutually and dynamically.  
 In other words: if one initially (at time t) had knowledge only of 
the distribution of the nodes, i.e., the actors (Σ p(B)), and then became 
informed of how, at this moment, action at the nodes is distributed given 
the network (Σ p(B|A)), formulas (9) and (13) teach us that this provides 
us with the same expected information (I) about the network distribution, 
given the nodes at t + 1 (i.e., the a posteriori distribution), as does the 
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message that the network distribution is conditioned by the nodes. The 
improvement is equal to the prediction based on the a priori network. Thus, 
one can study the coupled systems from either side, but one learns only in 
terms of their interaction. 
 
Interaction, conditionalization and the "freedom" of each system 
 Let us first focus on the interpretation of the a priori system which 
can be described with Σ p(B|A)/p(B) (in the right-hand factor of formula 
(13)). Obviously, this is a ratio; the denominator can be considered as a 
normalization term for the size of the action system in terms of the number 
of actors involved.viii  
 If the actions are independent p(B) = ΣA p(B|A), and in this case: 
 
 p(B|A)/p(B) = p(B|A) / ΣA p(B|A)    (15) 
 
 In qualitative terms this normalization means that a structure A as a 
self-referential system can only incorporate information in terms which 
have been conditioned by itself, and which have been normalized. For 
example, in a democracy as a normative system, the independence of votes is 
assumed, and the system accepts a decision with 51% in favour, regardless 
of whether the total number of voters in the system was a hundred or a 
million. Secondly, for example, a theoretical system like Newtonian 
mechanics cannot accept the upward motion of a plume as counter-evidence to 
the laws of gravity, since the only relevant action is to produce evidence 
which can be made available to it in its own theoretical terms. In the case 
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of a theoretical system, this normalization obviously refers also to the 
statistics. 
 Note that the normalization is symmetrical in A and B:  
 
 p(B|A) / p(B) = {p(B|A) * p(A)} / {p(B) * p(A)} = 
  p(A and B) / p(A) * p(B)    (16) 
 
 What has been said of structure, is thus also true of action insofar 
as action is to be considered as a system. If actions, however, are not 
independent in a system of actions, equality (15) no longer holds. 
 Actions can be coupled in a system (the actor), and this system can 
be "autopoietic" or not, dependent upon the form of the coupling. In other 
words: there are various ways in which actions can be aggregated. An action 
system is autopoietic if the actor is an individual who relates the actions 
internally. For example, if a scientist first must do research and only 
then can publish it, there is additional uncertainty created within his/her 
system since there are various ways in which the two acts can be related. 
Analogously, if there are (feedback) relations among actions by different 
actors in an organization (e.g., in a research community or a department), 
this system can have a more systematic impact on the relevant structures 
(e.g., the scientific communication system), since the assumption of 
independence among the actions is no longer valid. I return to the issue of 
the generation of uncertainty and redundancy by other actors in a later 
section. 
 In summary, a self-referential structure does not merge with the 
uncertainty in the events within its environment, but only with the 
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uncertainty which it has previously conditioned within its environment, and 
after normalization for the size of the events. In other words: structure 
and action exchange information only insofar as they are coupled, and only 
to the extent that the other system is performing above or below the a 
priori expectation. 
 However, how B is conditioned by A does not inform us about how A is 
conditioned by B, but only about their "mutual information," i.e., the 
extent to which the conditioning reduces the remaining uncertainty. 
Knowledge of this (static!) transmission between action and structure 
reduces the uncertainty in the transmission at the next moment. The 
remaining uncertainty in A (or B) remains always underdetermined (i.e., 
"free"): each system contains its own total uncertainty, on the basis of 
which it enters self-referential loops in which it conditions the actions 
which generate relevant information for it. After the cycle (a posteriori) 
the fact that a specific interaction with B has occurred belongs to the 
history of A (i.e., "is a given for A"). I shall show in a later section 
that this necessarily adds to the information content of A (i.e., by making 
history, A increases its probabilistic entropy). However, the system's 
uncertainty can increase only to the maximal amount of uncertainty it can 
contain, which is equal to the logarithm of its elements (log nA). 
 The freedom of the two systems with respect to each other can also be 
seen mathematically on the basis of another interpretation of the (above 
noted) quotient between p(B|A) and p(B). As noted the two factors refer to 
"actions" and "actors", respectively. The difference between the two 
factors (p(B) - p(B|A)) corresponds with that part of the uncertainty in B 
which is determined by A. At any moment, knowledge of the uncertainty in 
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the network improves our prediction of the uncertainty at the nodes of the 
network, but only for the part of the transmission, i.e., H(B) - H(B|A) ( = 
T(AB)) (see also Figure 1). It informs us only about the static transmission 
at that moment, i.e., about the impact of the vertical arrow in Figure 2, 
which indicates the instantaneous conditioning of actors by structure (cf. 
Giddens 1979). However, the other part of the uncertainty (HB|A) remains 
precisely undetermined by this conditioning, since it is only conditioned 
by it. Mutatis mutandis the same holds true for H(A|B). 
 Apart from the question of whether the actions are independent (i.e., 
whether equation (15) holds), the general algorithm for action/structure 
contingency relations (equation (13)) is necessarily true. The operation of 
the action system (e.g., actors) generates new information for structure, 
but the information adds to that part of the uncertainty in structure which 
is determined by this action system, and not to the remaining uncertainty. 
Therefore, left alone, two coupled systems would increasingly co-determine 
each other. However, in a multi-actor system other actions can add 
information to structure meanwhile, and thereby change the 
conditionalization. The synchronization of the relevant actions by 
structure leads to Markov chain transitions as a special case. 
 In summary: action pre-sorts information for structure, while it is 
itself conditioned by structure. However, the total information content of 
structure is independent of action: each system remains "free" at each 
moment in time. The improvement in the prediction is based only on the 
local interaction. Furthermore, because of the sigma in the algorithm the 
improvements are additive, and can therefore also be decomposed into single 
actions or subgroups of actions.  
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Empirical example 
 As noted, the resulting improvement in the prediction of A at the 
later moment is analytically due to the mutual information between A and B 
at the earlier moment. It is an evaluation of how much our knowledge of 
this transmission at the earlier moment informs us about the conditioning 
at the later moment. If there is conditionality in the (static) 
probabilistic relations between A and B, there is necessarily also dynamic 
coupling. 
 If the systems A and B are completely coupled in one operation, the 
I(A|B : A) is equal to I(B|A : B), since the relations are symmetrical in A and 
B. However, if each of two systems pursues its own respective operation, 
the effects of their boundedness by each other will be asymmetrical. Since 
I can also be used as a measure of the quality of the prediction, the 
formulas allow us to develop a measure of whether (and to what extent) the 
one type of data in empirical research on structure/action contingencies 
represents structure, while the other represents action, or vice versa. One 
can also easily imagine designs in which what is action at one moment in 
time will operate as structure at a later moment. Methodologically the two 
perspectives provide symmetrical tests, just as they do conceptually in the 
idea of a "mutual shaping" of structure and action by one another. 
 For an empirical illustration, let me use the transaction matrix of 
the aggregated citation data of 13 major chemistry journals among each 
other. These matrices can be easily compiled using the Journal Citation 
Reports of the Science Citation Index.ix I shall use the 1984 matrix for 
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the journals listed in Table 1 as the a priori distribution, and the 1985 
one as the a posteriori distribution. 
 In each year, the matrix contains a "being cited pattern" that can be 
taken as structure, and the "citing" side can be considered as action. By 
citing one another the journals reproduce structure in a subsequent year. 
Since the citation matrix contains information with respect to both the 
cited and the citing dimension, it should provide us with an opportunity to 
make predictions about this reproduction of structure. 
 In 1984, we can compute the (static) transmission between the "cited" 
and the "citing" side of this matrix by using formula (5). The expected 
information content of this message is 964.17 mbits of information. For 
1985, this mutual information is 972.48 mbits, i.e., 8.31 mbits more. 
However, in the dynamic model (i.e., by using formula (13)) we find an 
improvement in the prediction for 1985 to 969.73 mbits on the basis of 1984 
data.x This means that 5.56 mbits of the 8.31 mbits change in the 
transmission (or 66.9%) can be attributed to the previous transmission. In 
other words: the increase in the coupling is above expectation. (One reason 
for this may be that there occurred, for example, a grouping among the 
cited into a structure or feedback among the citing journals.) 
 Since the operations of "cited" and "citing" are mutual in this 
universe of 13 journals, this result remains the same when the matrix is 
transposed. The two systems are completely coupled, since there is only one 
operation, viz. citation. However, in the parallel and distributed computer 
model, one may also assume a communication system between the cited and the 
citing journals, in which the operations are mediated by the network, and 
thus in principle asymmetrical. In this case, one needs an independent 
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operationalization of structure in the communication system, e.g., in terms 
of the eigenstructure of the matrix. Note that the eigenstructure of an 
asymmetrical matrix is asymmetrical indeed.  
 In order to keep the analysis simple, let us make the (reasonable)xi 
assumption that this set of 13 journals can be grouped in three sets, 
namely: one of inorganic chemistry journals, one of organic chemistry 
journals, and one of journals which belong to the specialties of physical 
chemistry and chemical physics. (The attribution of the journals to these 
groups is given in Table 1.) This provides us, in a second research design, 
with a matrix of three cited clusters which represent the cited structure, 
and 13 citing journals which represent action. At a third level, we may 
then also group the citing journals, and analyze the three by three matrix 
which represents the interaction between the presumed cited and citing 
structures.  
 As above, on the basis of the 1984 matrix we can make a prediction of 
the transmission in the 1985 matrix. In the case of the asymmetrical matrix 
of three cited journal groups versus 13 independent citing journals, the 
actual transmission is 726.75 mbits in 1984 and 732.23 mbits in 1985.xii The 
prediction on the basis of 1984, is 731.81 for 1985, i.e., the prediction 
now covers 92.3% of the 5.48 mbits increase in the transmission (as against 
67.1% in the previous case). 
 If we subsequently assume that the citing action is not independent 
but completely grouped into the same three groups as the cited structure, 
the transmission is 669.33 mbits in 1984, and 672.43 in 1985. Now the 
prediction on the basis of 1984 is 673.02 mbits, which is 19.0% more than 
the observed increase in the transmission in 1985. Obviously, the 
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assumption of complete grouping on both the cited and the citing side 
overestimates the structural coupling.xiii 
 In summary: I have elaborated here only an elementary model as an 
example. It is crude, among other things, since I did not allow for more 
groupings than the one into three groups, and I assumed that the one-year 
difference was an adequate time-scale. However, within this model a fit 
larger than 0.92 is obtained if we assume that the cited side is 
structured, and that on the citing side the journals behave independently. 
 
Consequences for the history of the coupled systems 
 The improvement in the prediction by action (formula (13)) is 
necessarily positive, since it is equal to the message to the system that 
action has taken place (i.e., formula (9) above); and this latter formula 
can be shown to be necessarily positive (Theil 1972, pp. 59f). Therefore, 
the prediction of "structure given action" at the later stage is always 
improved if we know how structure conditioned action at the previous stage. 
In each cycle, there is an increase of expected information content, since 
the new (larger) value H(A|B) will be the initial value (H(A)) for the next 
cycle. Therefore, a structure/action contingency produces probabilistic 
entropy, and thus makes possible a history.xiv 
 Let me focus here on what it means theoretically and formally to say 
that structure gains probabilistic entropy by action. Intuitively it means 
that structure becomes more uncertain by action. Action incessantly adds to 
the uncertainty which prevails in the network. One can reduce this 
uncertainty only by the introduction of redundancy. (I return to this 
latter option in a later section.) 
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 How does the generation of uncertainty work? Let us decompose the a 
posteriori information content into the a priori ones, and see what is 
added. After a given event, the total uncertainty in the structure can be 
written as follows:  
 
 H(A|B)  = - Σ q(A|B) * log(q(A|B)) 
 
By using Bayes' formula, we can evaluate this a posteriori result into its 
a priori components, as follows: 
 
   p(A) * p(B|A)        p(A) * p(B|A) 
 H(A|B)  = - Σ ─────────────  * log{ ───────────── } 
     p(B)                 p(B)        
                                       
 
     
 = - Σ  [p(A) *  {p(B|A)/ p(B)}] * [ log{p(A)}  + log{p(B|A)/ p(B)}] 
 
 
(See a previous section for the interpretation of {p(B|A) / pB} as an a 
priori system.) 
 
 
 H(A|B) = - Σ p(A) * log{p(A)}  - Σ {p(B|A)/ p(B)} * log{p(B|A)/ p(B)} + 
 
  - Σ p(A) * log{p(B|A)/ p(B)}  - Σ {p(B|A)/ p(B)} * log{p(A)} 
 
 
 
  = H(A)  +  H(B|A)/(B)  + 
 
  - Σ p(A) * log{p(B|A)/ p(B)}  - Σ {p(B|A)/ p(B)} * log{p(A)} 
 
 
 
  = H(A)  +  H(B|A)/(B)  + 
 
  - Σ p(A) * log{q(A|B)/ p(A)}   
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  - Σ {p(B|A)/ p(B)} * log[q(A|B)/ {p(B|A)/ p(B)}] 
 
 
 
  = H(A)  +  H(B|A)/(B)  + 
 
   +  Σ p(A) * log{p(A)/ q(A|B)}   
 
   +  Σ {p(B|A)/ p(B)} * log[{p(B|A)/ p(B)} / q(A|B)]  (17) 
 
  
 Thus, the total uncertainty of the system a posteriori is equal to 
the sum of the uncertainties of two a priori systems (A and (B|A)/B) plus 
the sum of the information values of the messages that these systems have 
merged into one a posteriori structure. The sum of these two additional 
termsxv is equivalent to what may also be called the "in-between" group 
uncertainty (H0) upon decomposition of the total uncertainty in H(A) and 
H(B|A)/(B). Note the analogy between "later" and "more aggregated": both 
contain more uncertainty. However, this "in-between group" uncertainty is 
composed of two terms: the difference which it makes for the one a priori 
subset in relation to the a posteriori set, and the difference it makes for 
the other. An update cycle affects two (or more) a priori systems 
asymmetrically! 
 In the above formula, I decomposed the a posteriori expected 
information content H(A|B) into its various parts, which were given a 
meaning (on the right-hand side of the equation) in terms of the a priori 
states of the respective systems. Let me note that this is paradoxically 
what Bayesians always do, although they use a different rhetoric. The 
Bayesian frame of reference is not the a posteriori situation, but the a 
priori one. For example, the Bayesian philosopher asks what it means for 
the prior hypothesis that a piece of evidence becomes available (see, e.g., 
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Howson and Urbach 1989). That the hypothesis (or, analogously, the 
subjective belief) itself may have changed, and thus no longer be the same 
hypothesis, is for him/her usually of little concern. The Bayesian, 
however, is not interested in the further development of the a priori stage 
into the a posteriori one thanks to the new evidence, but only in the 
corroboration or falsification of the a priori hypothesis (see also: 
Leydesdorff 1992b). From a social science perspective, however, one is 
interested in what happened empirically, and not only in what this means in 
terms of the previous stage. However, explication of the meaning of what 
happened in terms of what was a priori adds obviously to the redundancy, 
and therefore has a positive function for the reflexive understanding. Note 
that some authors have wished to reserve the term "information" for 
denoting this (human) neg-entropy (e.g., Brillouin 1962; Bailey 1990), in 
contrast to probabilistic entropy or noise. 
 
Redundancy in social systems 
 It is counter-intuitive that the structure/action contingency would 
generate only uncertainty. "Structure" is usually believed to reduce 
uncertainty for "action". However, because of the equation between 
uncertainty, entropy and information in the Shannon/Luhmann paradigm, we 
must also redefine what is meant precisely by this reduction of uncertainty 
by structure (or action) in social systems. 
 In general, reduction of uncertainty is possible only when (Shannon-
type) information is relatively annihilated by an increase in redundancy. 
Redundancy is defined as the complement of the expected information content 
of a system to its maximal information content. Since necessarily H(B|A) <= 
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H(B), the conditioning of the actors by structure in action reduces 
uncertainty. However, as shown in the previous section, action subsequently 
adds to the uncertainty that prevails in a structure. 
 Until now, we have largely concentrated on the model of one action 
system B in relation to structure A. However, all other action systems (C, 
D, etc.) conditionalize structure as well. By using the same equation, it 
will be clear that these conditionalizations lead to a further reduction of 
the uncertainty in the structural system. Whether this will have an effect 
on the action system B depends on whether the redundancy is generated in 
that part of the information content of structure A which is transmitted to 
this action system (i.e., H(A) - H(A|B)) or in the remainder of the 
uncertainty in A (i.e., H(A|B)). In the latter case, this redundancy will 
have no effect on B as an actor, while in the former case the reduction of 
the uncertainty for actor B by structure A (i.e., H(B) - H(B|A)) in the action 
will be smaller than without the redundancy by the other actor. Therefore, 
H(B) and H(B|A) will be more equal; the log-factor in the algorithm (i.e., 
formula (13) above) will be closer to zero, and the impact of action upon 
structure will thus also be smaller. 
 In summary, the redundancy brought about by other actors may either 
be irrelevant for each single actor or may reduce the determination by the 
system, i.e., may free the individual actor more from the system; but by 
the same token then it also reduces the impact of his/her actions on the 
system. 
 Let me demonstrate this with the example of a family as a social 
system and of two parents and two children as actors. The maximal 
information content of this family system is 2log(4) = 2 bits. Empirically, 
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family life is usually structured, and thus the actual information content 
of the system will be lower. 
 Now, let us begin with an action by one of the neighbours. This 
cannot affect this family system directly, since the neighbour is not a 
member of it: it can only affect the system if it either induces action by 
one of the members of the family for reasons which lie within the context 
of this system, i.e., at the higher level of how this system is integrated 
in, e.g., the neighbourhood-system. The action by a neighbour generates 
redundancy in the neighbourhood-system, and thereby reduces the overall 
uncertainty in which the family-system has to operate. This redundancy may 
be partly transmitted to individual members of the family to varying 
degrees. One may wish to call this "social control". 
 Note that at the neighbourhood level we can either attribute 
transmissions directly to individual actors or use grouping rules (by using 
formula (6) above). In this case, some uncertainty can also be attributed 
to the "in between group" uncertainty. 
 Within the family system, the children can, for example, argue with 
each other. This as an action adds to the entropy of this system. Each 
parent can try to intervene in this argument, and may successfully change 
the course of action of each of the children. If so, this parent reduces 
uncertainty for the children by using his/her impact on the family 
structure in order to conditionalize this system so that it affects the 
child's room for action. However, at the same time, this action also 
necessarily contributes to the overall uncertainty in the family system. 
(The restriction may, for example, be ambiguous.) The paradoxical 
consequence is that the parent can only reduce the child's room for action 
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by adding to the uncertainty of the family system, and by thus giving the 
child more freedom as an actor, i.e., reducing its determination by the 
system, and thereby reducing its expected impact on the system. 
 However, if the parents go away, they may take all kind of decisions 
which then heavily influence the further development of this family system. 
However, these actions cannot affect the child's room for action at the 
same moment. First, the family system has to be updated with the 
information content of the message of these parental actions. The effect of 
the update may affect the room for the children to argue with each other or 
not. For example, the decision to add another element to the system, i.e., 
to take on a third child, undoubtedely enlarges the future possibilities to 
argue, since it extends the maximal entropy of the system. 
 The need for an update before a change in the relations can be 
achieved points to another important mechanism of reduction of uncertainty 
in social systems: a priori structures hold as long as they are not 
updated. In the meantime a lot of entropy may have been produced within the 
system, but this new information cannot intervene in the relation of each 
individual actor to the system before the update. Since the individual 
actor is conditionalized by the prior state of the system, (s)he has to 
cope with less uncertainty than if (s)he had to take all available 
information into account. Thus, information may even have been destroyed 
(e.g., as a result of the generation of redundancy by another system) 
before the system is updated. 
 This mechanism is particularly useful for an understanding of the 
working of a functionally differentiated system. In this case, the total 
information content of the social system is disaggregated in accordance 
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with specific grouping rules, with the consequence that an actor in one of 
the subsystems is confronted only with that part of the uncertainty which 
is of special relevance to him/her in this subsystem. The subsystem is 
provisionally shielded against perturbations in the environment. However, 
from time to time the system has to be updated. Then, the disaggregation 
may change correspondingly, and the actor will be conditionalized by a new 
set of structural arrangements.  
 In my opinion, along these lines we can also gain a better 
understanding of the meaning of Giddens' (1979) notion of "the duality of 
structure". Structure, according to Giddens (1984), is a "set of rules and 
resources" which is recursively implicated in action. However, Giddens 
acknowledges that in society there are various "structures" which are 
therefore defined as "rule-resource sets." Obviously, each of them implies 
a specific grouping of the overall uncertainty. This leads to the reduction 
of uncertainty for social action within each subset. Institutionalization 
and routines can serve as means for the imposition of this redundancy. 
 However, after the action(s), i.e., a posteriori, the system and the 
relevant subsystems have gained in entropy. Therefore, the decomposition 
may also have to change. However, the shielding now works as a delay. A 
posteriori there is necessarily more uncertainty in comparison with the 
situation in which the a priori demarcations were made, but the system does 
not have necessarily to update. Giddens' problem of the "duality of 
structure" can now be considered as the problem that the system has no 
yardstick to evaluate this change other than its prior organization, while, 
as noted in the previous section, the additional uncertainty cannot be 
fully explained in terms of the a priori uncertainty, since a posteriori it 
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includes the information content of the message that each system has gone 
into the a posteriori state. Since these messages are asymmetrical for each 
system, the system cannot oversee how much uncertainty is generated 
overall, but only that part to which it can recur. It therefore has to 
decide whether it wishes to maintain the previous organization of its 
identity under the risk of not incorporating as much uncertainty as it 
might be able to contain after an update, or risk losing its (recursive) 
identity. In summary, a central question for social and evolutionary 
systems is whether or not it is timely for an update. 
 The continuous creation of uncertainty in its contingent relation 
requires counterbalancing mechanisms to stabilize each system. The 
reduction of uncertainty by the introduction of redundancy, reflexively 
reinforced by giving specific parts of the a priori information content 
symbolic meaning, plays a crucial role here. However, the issue of how 
social and psychological stability are maintained under pressure from the 
continuous relevance of events in structurally coupled systems goes beyond 
the limits of this study. 
  
 
 27
 
Redundancy on the side of actors 
 Similarly, human actors are self-referential systems which have to 
integrate in one way or another the information contained in the message of 
any event which is a result of their interaction with a relevant social 
structure. Again, the uncertainty can only be integrated after proper 
normalization, and in terms of the system itself. In order to understand 
the communication, the uncertainty has to be processed internally by giving 
it a meaning in terms of the actor system. To give meaning is therefore a 
reflexive action, i.e., it is an action internal to the actor system. In 
this action, the incoming uncertainty is again evaluated against preset and 
recursive standards, i.e., the information content of the primary 
observation is observed in a second-order cybernetics. However, in this 
case the organization is not a grouping of the total uncertainty in terms 
of a differentiation, as in the case of society, but in terms of the 
reflexive identity of the actor(s). 
 How actors reflexively give meaning to incoming uncertainty, is in 
itself the subject of psychology (cf. Luhmann 1984). However, the mechanism 
of balancing between redundancy and variation which I described above for 
social systems must have its cybernetic analogon in the action system, 
since it has survival value. The structure/action contingency necessarily 
generates uncertainty; and both of the systems involved in this contingency 
relation have to provide mechanisms for selection and stabilization. 
Otherwise, they would rapidly disintegrate (i.e., become chaotic), and thus 
no longer be able to reproduce themselves as systems. 
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Conclusion 
 The algorithm which I specified in this article only teaches us about 
the uncertainty which becomes available through interactions in the 
contingent relations between "structure" and "action". How this interaction 
is integrated can only be answered within the framework of respectively a 
theory of communication, i.e., a sociology, and a theory of the actor, 
i.e., a psychology. There is still a great difference beteen a single 
general algorithm for structure/action contingencies and a general theory 
of social action. 
 However, the derivation of this one algorithm and the discussion of 
its various consequences for the interacting systems elucidates the power 
of the newly emerging cybernetic paradigm in sociology. The implied 
"Gestalt switch" consists of two central elements: Shannon's (1948) 
equation of information with uncertainty (see, e.g., Hayles 1990), and 
Luhmann's (1984) understanding of society as an "autopoietic" communication 
system with its own forms of organization (e.g., functional 
differentiation), and which is analytically different from (but 
structurally coupled with) the organization of individual actors as 
autopoietic systems (cf. Leydesdorff 1993b). One purpose of this study has 
been to show that the implied problems can consistently be brought down to 
the level of puzzles which can be solved. 
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Table 1 
13 journals used for the construction of an aggregated journal-journal 
citation network 
 
journals:       grouping: 
 
Chemical Physics      chemical physics 
Chemical Physics Letters     chemical physics 
Inorganic Chemistry     inorganic chemistry 
J. of the American Chemical Society    organic chemistry 
J. of Chemical Physics     chemical physics 
J. of the Chemical Society- Dalton Transactions inorganic chemistry 
J. of Organic Chemistry     organic chemistry 
J. of Organometallic Chemistry    inorganic chemistry 
J. of Physical Chemistry      chemical physics 
Molecular Physics      chemical physics 
Physical Review A      chemical physics 
Tetrahedron       organic chemistry 
Tetrahedron Letters     organic chemistry 
  
*.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Joint EC/Leiden Conference on
Science and Technology Indicators 1991 (cf. Leydesdorff 1993a). 
i.I use the binary base of the logarithm throughout this study, and 
therefore express the information in bits. 
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ii.Strictly speaking, chi-square tests only independence; it provides 
little information about the strength or form of the association 
between the two variables.  
iii.The so-called likelihood ratio chi-square (L2 = 2 Σi Σj Fij ln (Fij / F^ij) 
is equally decomposable into interpretable parts that add up to the 
total. This measure is in essence an information-theoretical 
formulation of the chi-square. See also: Krippendorff (1986).  
iv.For a proof see Theil (1972, pp. 59f.). 
v.In the case of q = p, no information is added or lost; since the 
log(1) = 0, I vanishes. Note that a zero in the prior distribution 
would make a non-zero value in the posterior distribution a complete 
surprise, and therefore, I -> . See also: Leydesdorff (1990 and 
1992a). 
vi.For a further elaboration of the relations among statistical 
decomposition analysis, regression analysis, and Markov chain 
analysis, the reader is referred to Theil (1972).  
vii.Even if action fails to take place this may also condition the network. 
As we will see below, structure normalizes action, and therefore 
contains an expectation value. Note also that action may lead to a 
null-message, i.e., to a message containing no information. See, 
e.g., Bertsekas and Tsitisklis 1989.  
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viii.In Bayesian philosophy, this term is a normalization constant because 
of the logical complementarity of the hypothesis and its negation 
(see also: Pearl 1988, p. 32.) 
ix.In order to minimize the amount of expected information content 
originated by missing values in otherwise similar distributions, I 
have replaced all missing values in this study with the value of 
five, since this is the cutoff level of the printed edition of the 
Journal Citation Reports of the Science Citation Index from which the 
data were obtained (Garfield 1972). For a further discussion of this 
matrix see (Leydesdorff 1991). 
x.Note that we can also use formula (13) to compute the transmission in a 
static model. 
xi.The same data were analyzed in more detail in (Leydesdorff 1991). 
xii.These relatively smaller transmissions in absolute terms are larger 
parts of the total uncertainty in the respective matrices, since the 
matrices are differently shaped, and can therefore hold less entropy. 
xiii.The assumption of grouping in only the citing action overestimates the 
coupling with 5.9%. 
xiv.However, having a history does not imply that this history is always 
important for later developments. For example, the system may have 
the Markov property or go through path-dependent transitions. In such   
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cases, historical information can lose its relevance for further 
developments (cf. Leydesdorff 1992a). 
xv.Since these are information contents of messages about change, they can 
be shown to be necessarily positive (see, Theil 1972, pp. 59f.). 
